With the inevitable passage of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, colloquially known as the Iran deal, we can take stock of what this deal accomplishes.
Let’s begin with the facts.
Under the terms of the agreement, Iran will have to reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98 percent and must keep its level of enrichment at 3.6 percent.
The number of centrifuges they can operate is reduced by two-thirds and only the oldest centrifuges will remain. They will not be allowed to enrich at the Fordow facility at all.
In addition, Iran must redesign and rebuild the heavy water reactor in Arak so that it cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. Its spent fuel will be shipped out of the country and they will not be able to build any additional water reactors for 15 years.
Furthermore, IAEA inspectors will gain unprecedented access to Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain, which includes continuous (that is immediate, round the clock) monitoring of all of their declared nuclear sites.
Nuclear expert Graham Allison has called this agreement “the most intrusive verification and inspection regime ever negotiated.”
This is also the position taken by 29 US nuclear scientists in a letter sent to President Obama.
Moreover, in a joint statement issued by 77 nuclear non-proliferation experts, the deal was hailed as a “strong, long-term, and verifiable agreement that will be a net-plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.”
These experts also concluded that it is “very likely that any future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly, providing an opportunity to intervene decisively to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”
Now let’s look at some of the counter arguments to the deal and see if they stand up to scrutiny.
Two points of contention from critics have to do with the fact that 1. there will not be “anytime, anywhere” inspections of possible undeclared nuclear sites and 2. that there are inadequate inspection provisions for the so-called possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.
An oft-repeated claim is that there will be a 24-day delay before inspectors can gain access to any of Tehran’s possible undeclared nuclear sites.
But as nuclear nonproliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis has explained, “Far from giving Iran 24 days, the IAEA will need to give only 24 hours’ notice before showing up at a suspicious site to take samples. Access could even be requested with as little as two hours’ notice, something that will be much more feasible now that Iran has agreed to let inspectors stay in-country for the long term. Iran is obligated to provide the IAEA access to all such sites… There is a strict time limit on stalling. Iran must provide access within two weeks. If Iran refuses, the Joint Commission set up under the deal must decide within seven days whether to force access. Following a majority vote in the Joint Commission — where the United States and its allies constitute a majority bloc — Iran has three days to comply. If it doesn’t, it’s openly violating the deal, which would be grounds for the swift return of the international sanctions regime, known colloquially as the “snap back.”
Indeed, what is significant about this agreement is that these time limits and constraints exist at all.
Without this deal, there would be no further constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran will be free to continue unobstructed.
Some critics of the deal have expressed concern that once the deal is implemented, our European allies will be reluctant to force inspections.
As Sen. Chuck Schumer stated, “it is reasonable to fear that, once the Europeans become entangled in lucrative economic relations with Iran, they may well be inclined not to rock the boat by voting to allow inspections.”
The problem with this objection is that it ignores that the Europeans are eager to do business with Iran now.
As in the case of the possible 24-day delay, the choice is between a two-week (or longer) delay or nothing.
And make no mistake, if we were to walk away from this deal now, it’s on us.
Europe (and Russia and China) will continue to move forward implementing the deal.
If we give the JCPOA a chance to succeed, it is reasonable to assume our European allies will be just as motivated as we are to make sure Iran meets its obligations.
After all, our partners put aside their economic interests in order to achieve this agreement in the first place. If it’s the Iranians who are seen as blowing up the deal, it’s on them, and we will retain our leverage.
As we have seen, that Iran could stall entry for up to 24 days does not pose as significant a challenge as is suggested by opponents of the deal.
As Sen. Schumer admits, inspectors will be able to detect radioactivity long after nuclear material has been removed. It’s been suggested in this newspaper that “arriving at a site after radioactive material has been moved will not tell us where the fissile material is located now, or what Iran is doing with it.”
But of course if we found that Iran was using fissile material and then tried to hide it from inspectors, Iran would be openly violating the terms of the deal and the US and its allies would take swift action to ensure that Iran suffers the consequences.
But Sen. Schumer worries that we won’t be able to detect any “illicit building and improving of possible military dimensions — the tools that go into building a bomb but don’t emit radioactivity.”
Here’s Lewis again in response: “the simple truth is, some aspects of weapons work are hard to detect — no matter what. So what’s the alternative? To not prohibit that work? To permit Iran to do things like paper studies on nuclear weapons development because it’s hard to verify that prohibition? Again, that’s crazy. The Iran deal defines weapons work in far more detail than any previous agreement.”
This deal will only strengthen our intelligence and expand our insight into their program.
The IAEA has outlined a “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues” intended to deal with the issues related to PMD.
With respect to the deal’s secret annexes or side deals, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano has stated that the arrangements are “technically sound and consistent with our long-established practices. They do not compromise our safeguards in any way.”
Finally, this deal also ensures that Iran’s “breakout” time for a bomb would be extended from two months, as it is now, to a year, giving the U.S. and its allies ample time to respond in the event of an Iranian “rush” toward a bomb.
In other words, every pathway Iran has to make a nuclear bomb is cut off under this agreement.
Is the deal perfect? No. Did we get everything we wanted? No. Can we be 100 percent certain the deal will succeed? No.
These requirements would mean the deal must reach an impossible standard and therefore diplomacy would fail by definition. So at this point, the obvious question must be asked of the deal’s opponents:
What is your realistic alternative?
If the policy of the United States government is that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and it is believed that they are pursuing one, then there are two paths for trying to achieve this goal: diplomacy or military conflict.
Peace or war.
The deal that is on the table is the best on offer from the diplomatic route. And as we’ve seen, it’s a pretty good deal.
There is no mythical beast some have called a “better deal.”
The purpose of the multilateral sanctions was to bring Iran to the table and negotiate a deal that does not allow them to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Our P5+1 partners had no desire or will to strip Iran of a nuclear program entirely and they are eager to get back to business with Iran, which means that if the U.S. walks away from this deal, it will be the U.S. and Israel that will be further isolated.
As the vote by the UN Security Council shows, the world wants this deal and is ready to normalize relations with Iran.
If the U.S. is perceived as the reason it fails, we have every reason to believe the sanctions will erode and Iran will continue its march toward a bomb. With more cash. That part is inevitable.
The other option, military conflict, would be an even bigger disaster.
Unlike many politicians in Washington, I have not forgotten the Iraq War.
The arguments for war in Iraq were the same you hear from Iran hawks now (largely the same crowd): We must go to war in order to prevent weapons of mass destruction since containment of the Iranian regime is impossible because they are not a rational actor.
The fact that Iran has committed to these negotiations is proof enough that the regime is rational and as interested in its own survival as we imagine ourselves to be.
But even if you doubt this, we know how the Iraq War turned out and Iran is a vastly bigger country with a vastly bigger nuclear infrastructure.
I believe a war with Iran would be far more costly than even Iraq was.
According to the Obama administration, the best possibility the military option could offer is halting their program for just a few years.
We will never eliminate their know-how and the Iranians would be more united and motivated than ever to start over. This agreement freezes their program for at least 15 years.
And without the costs in blood and treasure that would be necessary for war with Iran.
On top of everything else, the American public has no appetite for more war and the Iranian dissidents who fought against the regime in the Green Movement protests, the Iranian youth, a pro-Western and educated people who are the future of Iran, overwhelmingly support this deal.
What’s more, the same hardline policies we’ve had in place for a decade-and-a-half had gotten us to where we were before the interim agreement: an unfettered Iranian nuclear program that was expanding rapidly. Isn’t it time we tried something different?
The diplomatic path is not without risk (no course of action could ever be), but there is no reason to not give peace a chance.
Recent history has shown that diplomatic agreements net positive benefits in the long run (Nixon and China, Reagan and Soviet Union).
Even if you think this deal is flawed, we should improve the deal rather than scrap it entirely. If we believe Iran is cheating, our partners will back us and we can reimpose sanctions.
The same can be said for some of the deal’s loosening restrictions in 10-15 years. If we decide we want to strengthen them, we can do so, and we will have our partners.
The military option is still on the table and will be in 15 years time.
So the deal increases our leverage while we give up nothing. If we walk away now, we will be alone and Iran will be free to do whatever it wants.
If we fear empowering the Iranian regime with cash and weapons — outcomes we will also not be able to prevent in the long run given that these specific restrictions were put in place for the purpose of the nuclear negotiations — because of both the nature of the regime itself and because of its support for the Assad regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon, just consider how empowered Iran would be if they obtained a nuclear weapon and how much we’d have to fear then. This deal is our best chance of preventing that outcome, which everyone in this debate claims to want.
Furthermore, rapprochement with Iran provides us with an opportunity for Iran to play a more constructive role on the world stage and might allow us to solve other regional conflicts such as the Syrian civil war.
Achieving a political settlement through applying pressure to Mr. Assad will require Iran’s participation.
Lastly, as U.S. ambassador to the UN Samantha Power has noted, if Congress were to reject this deal it would be a self-inflicted wound and diminish our standing in the world.
We would essentially abdicate U.S. global leadership as our allies, enemies and frenemies alike would see that the U.S. cannot follow through on its commitments.
Enacting this agreement means choosing peace over war and that we are not doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past.
This deal has the support of the President of the United States and the U.S. foreign policy establishment; our P5+1 partners; the UN Security Council; the majority of nuclear nonproliferation experts; U.S. scientists and diplomats; Israeli intelligence officials; Iranian dissidents; the majority of American Jews.
And it’s the right thing to do. The security of the United States of America, Israel and the world depends on it.
David Michaels
Roslyn Heights
