There are still many unresolved issues despite “MTA board approves 3rd track study” (Noah Manskar, May 5).
The Environmental Impact Statement as part of the study approved by the MTA Board appears to be in compliance with the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act.
Why didn’t anyone on the MTA Board question why there was no reference to the National Environmental Protect Action?
Without following NEPA, the MTA/LIRR forfeits any opportunity to access U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration or Federal Highway Administration funding.
U.S. DOT FTA provides over $1.2 billion in yearly formula grant assistance to the MTA.
The LIRR’s annual share averages $150 million, not counting east side access.
This is supplemented by New Starts and other competitive discretionary dollars which over any Five Year Capital Plan can average one to two billion.
Why would the MTA board members not want to preserve the option to apply for U.S. DOT FTA capital funding in the future for this project?
Was it to avoid U.S. DOT FTA oversight over the project especially the environmental review process?
In 2005, the project was following National Environmental Protect Action with the intention of applying to U.S. DOT FTA for construction funding.
In response to both community and political opposition from elected officials, the project was canceled by that generations senior MTA and LIRR Management team.
President Trump has proposed a 10-year trillion dollar infrastructure program.
Sen. Schumer and Democrats have done the same.
This is one program which Democrats and Republicans, city, suburban and even rural transit advocates might agree on.
Even if reduced to several hundred million, it could have been a potential funding source if National Environmental Protect Action was followed.
Financing this project still remains unresolved.
The anticipated final potential cost will never be known until completion.
Costs will be further refined by award of construction contracts followed by any unforeseen site conditions and change orders to the base contracts during the course of construction.
Even $2 billion may be insufficient.
There is only $7 million to support planning, preliminary design and engineering along with environmental work approved in the $29 billion 2015- 2019 MTA Five-Year Capital Program.
Gov. Cuomo’s belief that $2 billion more can be found to amend actual construction and grade crossing elimination funding later this year into the existing 2015-2019 MTA Five-Year Capital Program will be difficult.
It is subject to approval by both the MTA Capital Program Review Board and State Legislature.
If he attempts to provide $2 billion for Main Line Third Track, NYC advocates who play a critical role in the process, looking for $5 billion to fund Second Avenue subway phase 2, may also ask for $2 billion for their priority project.
How would Cuomo find $4 billion instead of $2 billion more?
Cuomo proposed providing $1.5 billion more toward the $8.3 billion shortfall he originally promised two years ago to fully fund the $27 billion 2015-2019 MTA Five-Year Capital Plan.
This leaves a balance of $5.8 billion that he owes carried over into 2018 and 2019.
The new $153 billion state budget failed to deal with these financial shortfalls.
Cuomo and his aides have publicly stated that there is no need to deal with any other issues prior to adjournment of the State Legislature in June.
They said, “Everything big we wanted to get done, we got done in the budget,” the governor declared over the weekend.
(Source: “What Cuomo Won’t Fight For” New York Post Editorial, April 17).
Cuomo still also finds $3 billion to pay back the federal loan for Tapan Zee Bridge and $6 billion for his commitment to support the NJ to NY Amtrak Gateway Tunnel project (a new connection for Amtrak and New Jersey Transit across the Hudson River to access Penn Station).
The list goes on and on for Cuomo’s unfunded transportation commitments including Main Line Third Track over the past two years totaling $100 billion.
After completion of double tracking in 2018, Ronkonkoma Branch riders will enjoy off peak 30 minute service.
However, there will be no additional rush hour trains in the a.m. to Penn Station or p.m. from Penn Station to Ronkonkoma.
There is no capacity on the existing Main Line between Floral Park and Hicksville to accommodate any additional rush hour trains on the Ronkonkoma branch.
Capacity can only be increased by construction of the proposed Main Line Third Track project
There is also a direct relationship between completion of the $10.8 billion LIRR Grand Central Terminal East Side Access in December 2023 or 2024 along with $2 billion Main Line Third Track.
Without a Third Track, the LIRR will not be able to achieve 100% utilization of Grand Central Terminal East Side Access.
The original east side access environmental document promised 24 trains per hour during peak service periods.
This would supplement 42 trains per hour during peak service periods to Penn Station.
There is insufficient capacity for feeding west bound a.m. rush hour and east bound p.m. rush hour trains from both Penn Station and Grand Central Terminal with only two Main Line Tracks.
The third track is also needed for reverse commuter service and trains returning east in the morning and west in the evening to make a second rush hour trip.
The LIRR still has yet to release a detailed project budget which would justify a $2 billion dollar budget.
Based upon my review of the project, you are now looking at a minimum potential project cost of $2.2 billion or more.
These funds may have to be spread out between the 2020-2024 and 2025-2029 future Five Year Capital Programs.
A real project budget would include the estimated costs for each project component.
This would include but not be limited to design and engineering, overall construction, private property easements, utility relocation, commuter parking and station improvements, track, signal and power work, sound barriers, construction for each of seven grade crossing eliminations, construction management firms to supplement LIRR Engineers in oversight of construction contractors, LIRR force account (LIRR track employees who provide protection for construction contractors employees working on active track right of ways), LIRR budget and financial staff, LIRR quality assurance and quality control staff (to insure the contractor adheres to the contract specifications and requirements), substitute bus service during frequent track outages and contingency (to deal bids coming in above the engineers estimate, change orders due to unforeseen site conditions or changes in scope requested by various LIRR user groups or other issues during construction).
This just highlights a few of the major project cost components.
This information continues to be needed if the MTA/LIRR wish to build credibility with commuters, residents, taxpayers, transit advocates, elected officials and the media.
The proposed project implementation schedule of three to four years continues to be overly optimistic.
It may not take into consideration delays in obtaining funding, time for procurement process from advertisement to the awarding of contracts, unforeseen site conditions, inclement weather, insufficient track outages and insufficient LIRR force account support track outages for construction contractors.
That the current proposed project budget continues to be based upon the total lack of detail other than an overall figure of $2 billion is disappointing.
Two years after Cuomo first announced the rebirth of this project, the estimated cost grew from $1 billion to $1.5 billion last year and $2 billion this year.
It has yet to progress beyond a number written on the back of an envelope.
Regardless of whether you are for or against this project, the taxpayers need to know what the source of funding and final tab will be.
In the end, taxpayer dollars will be paying for it.
Is there any relationship between labor unions, construct contractors, consulting firms and other members of the business community who support this project and have endorsed or given campaign contributions to Cuomo’s 2018 reelection campaign commonly known as “pay for play?”
Sadly it appears that most of these concerns and questions were neither addressed or discussed at the recent MTA April Board Meeting.
Larry Penner
Great Neck
(Larry Penner is a transportation historian and advocate who previously worked 31 years for the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration Region 2 NY Office.)
