This is a two-part letter with more Liberty background. Todays first part will cover the background and air attack. Next week, Part 2 will describe the torpedo-boat attack, provide more information on US government agency conclusions, and a few select words on treason.
I have to give the USS Liberty representatives credit for their persistence which is unfortunately not matched by their judgment and evidence. (Unanswered questions about USS Liberty, Dec. 12, 2014).
Their conspiracy-theory “proofs” are of the “he-says-she-says” ilk and contain an ample sprinkling of antisemitism. I have seen not a single morsel of evidence that the attackers knew the Liberty’s origin till the attack was virtually over.
Certainly those who experienced the attack, horrible as it was, have no such proof beyond the fact of Israel’s attack itself. Though the Liberty was equipped to gather data the veterans have presented no incriminating data so far.
But there is ample data from both US and Israeli sources that show the attackers thought the Liberty was an Egyptian ship, and indeed it should not even have been where it was.
The attack occurred pursuant to unfortunate errors on the part of both Israel and the US both before and during the operation. These can fairly be called “negligent,” even “grossly negligent,” but not criminally negligent. A comprehensive review of the attack’s prelude, occurrence and follow-up is, once again, presented in the 98-page document: http://tinyurl.com/khsuzkl
Mr. Meadors discounts the report as biased but has yet to contradict a single fact therein. I will review highlights and include some recently declassified regulatory-organization material, pursuant to Mr. Meador’s request, even as I am aware that, for conspiracy theorists, there are no answers.
The picture that emerges is not one of crime at all but of a string of failed communications, human errors, unfortunate coincidences and equipment failures on both the American and Israeli sides – the kind of tragic, senseless mistake that is all too common in the thick of war. Without such errors friendly-fire incidents would be rare.
On May 24, 1967, in response to Egypt’s closure of the Tiran Strait, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the U.S. Sixth Fleet to advance into the eastern Mediterranean.
Aware of the danger of becoming embroiled in an Arab-Israeli war, however, Washington cautioned the fleet to remain, until further notice, “outside an arc whose radius is 240 miles from Port Said,” on the Egyptian coast.
A half mile off shore, and anxious about proximity to the fighting, Liberty Capt. McGonagle asked the Sixth Fleet commander, Vice-Adm. William Martin, for permission to pull back from the shore, or else to be provided with a destroyer escort. Martin rejected these requests, noting that the Liberty “is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation.”
Unbeknownst to both Martin and McGonagle, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had repeatedly cabled the Liberty the previous night with instructions to withdraw to a distance of one hundred miles from the Egyptian and Israeli coasts. The transmission was delayed, however, by the navy’s overloaded, overly complex communication system which misrouted the messages. The JCS orders would not be received by the Liberty until the following day, June 9, by which time they would no longer be relevant. From a House Armed Services Committee Report, May 10, 1971
Four messages, ordering that USS. Liberty be moved away from the coasts of Israel and the United Arab Republic were directed to that ship on June 7-8, 1967.
The first of those messages was released by the sender about 13 hours before the time the ship was attacked, while the last was released for transmission 3 ½ hours before the attack. None of them had reached Liberty prior to the attack. Two messages had been misrouted to the Pacific rather than to the Mediterranean.
One of those, upon being retransmitted to the Pentagon, was then missent to Fort Meade rather than USS. Liberty. The other was not placed on Fleet Broadcast until nine hours after the attack on USS. Liberty. One message was lost in a relay station and never relayed. All experienced inexcusable delays for in-station processing.
At 5:55 a.m. on June 8, Israeli Commander Uri Meretz, aboard a reconnaissance plane, noted what he believed to be an American supply vessel, designated GTR-5, 7- miles west of the Gaza coast. Haifa naval staff officers fixed the location of the ship with a red marker, indicating “unidentified,” on their control board. Research, however, established the vessel’s identity as the Liberty. The marker was changed to green, for “neutral.”
Another sighting of the ship was made by an Israeli fighter aircraft at 9:00 a.m., 20 miles north of El-Arish, on the Sinai coast, which had fallen to Israeli forces the day before. Neither of these reports made mention of the 5-by-8-foot American flag which, according to the ship’s crewmen, was flying from the Liberty’s starboard halyard.
The crew would testify later that six Israel Air Force aircraft subsequently flew over the ship, giving them ample opportunity to identify its nationality. Israel Air Force reports, however, make no further mention of the Liberty.
There may indeed have been additional Israeli overflights, but the IAF pilots were not looking for the Liberty. Their target was Egyptian submarines, which had been spotted off the coast. At 11:00 a.m., while the hunt for Egyptian submarines was on, the officer on duty at naval headquarters, Capt. Avraham Lunz, concluded his shift. In accordance with procedures, he removed the Liberty’s green marker on the grounds that it was already five hours old and no longer accurate.
The chain of reactions was started by explosions at El Arish at 11:24. Since Israel controlled the air and the ground, they made the assumption that they were being shelled from the sea and two warships were in view.
Though the explosion probably resulted from an ammunition dump fire, that was unknown at the time, and both Egyptian and Israeli sources had reported shelling of the area by Egyptian warships the previous day. There was therefore good reason to conclude that the Egyptian navy had trained its guns on Sinai.
Minutes after the explosion, the Liberty turned in the direction of Port Said.
Meanwhile, reports of naval bombardment on El-Arish continued to reach IDF General Staff in Tel Aviv.
Rabin took them seriously, concerned that the shelling was a prelude to an amphibious landing that could outflank Israeli troops. He reiterated the standing order to sink any unidentified ships in the war area.
Since no fighter planes were available, the navy was asked to intercede, with air cover provided later. After a half hour of inaction the General Staff issued a rebuke: “The coast is being shelled and you – the navy – have done nothing.” At 12:05 p.m. Capt. Izzy Rahav, who had replaced Lunz, dispatched three torpedo boats to destroy the enemy vessel responsible for the bombardment.
At 1:41 p.m., Ensign Aharon Yifrah, combat information officer aboard the flagship of three torpedo boats, T-204, informed its captain, Cmdr. Moshe Oren, that an unidentified ship had been sighted northeast of El-Arish, sailing toward Egypt, at a range of 22 miles and at an (incorrectly) estimated speed of 30 knots. It meant that the ship could not be the Liberty, whose maximum speed was 18 knots. Moreover, the Israelis had standing orders to fire on any unknown vessel in the area sailing at over 20 knots, a speed which, at that time, was attainable only by fighting ships. This information, and the ship’s direction, indicated that the ship was likely the enemy destroyer that had “shelled” El-Arish.
Two Mirage III fighters were diverted from the Suez Canal. Making two passes at 3,000 feet, formation commander Capt. Spector reckoned that the ship was a “Z” or Hunt-class destroyer without the deck markings of the Israeli Navy. Spector then spoke with air force commander Gen. Motti Hod, who asked him repeatedly whether he could see a flag.
The answer was “Negative.” Nor were there any distinguishing marks other than some “black letters” painted on the hull.
IAF Intelligence Chief Col. Yeshayahu Bareket also claimed to have contacted American naval attaché Castle at this point in an attempt to ascertain whether the suspect ship was the Liberty, but the latter professed no knowledge of the Liberty’s schedule – a claim later denied by Castle but, strangely, confirmed by McGonagle. After two low sweeps by the lead plane, at 1:58 p.m., the Mirages were cleared to attack.
The Mirages made three strafing runs and were then joined by two additional aircraft, Israeli Super-Mysteres returning from the Mitla Pass. Nine men were killed in the initial assault, and several times that number wounded, among them McGonagle. The antennas were damaged and oil drums set afire.
Radio operators on board found most of their frequencies inoperable and barely managed to send an SOS to the Sixth Fleet. After fourteen minutes of action, the pilots reported having made good hits – over eight hundred holes would later be counted in the hull. The entire superstructure of the ship, from the main deck to the bridge, was aflame.
Throughout these sorties, no one aboard the Liberty suspected that the planes were Israeli.
Indeed, rumors spread that the attackers were Egyptian MiGs. After the first strike, the visibility that had enabled crewmen to identify IAF reconnaissance craft earlier in the day was lost to the smoke of battle. One of the Israeli pilots, curious as to why the vessel had not returned fire, made a final pass at ninety feet. “I see no flag,” he told headquarters. “But there are markings on the hull – Charlie-Tango-Romeo-five.”
The fact that the ship had Western markings led Rabin to fear that it was Soviet, and he immediately called off the jets.
Two IAF Hornet helicopters were sent to look for survivors – Spector had reported seeing men overboard – while the torpedo boat squadron was ordered to hold its fire pending further attempts at identification. Though that order was recorded in the torpedo boat’s log, Oren claimed he never received it. It was now 2:20 pm; twenty-four minutes would pass before the squadron made contact with the Liberty.
During that interval, the ship’s original flag, having been shredded during the attack, was replaced by a larger (7-by-13-foot) holiday ensign. As the crew labored to tend to the wounded, extinguish the fire, and burn classified papers, contact was finally made with the Sixth Fleet. “Help is on the way,” replied the carrier America, which quickly unleashed eight F-104s armed with nuclear weapons.
Before reaching their objective, however, the jets were recalled by Vice-Adm. Martin. If Rabin feared that the ship was Russian, Martin suspected that its attackers were Russian, and without authorization from the highest level, he did not want to risk starting a nuclear war.
End of Part 1.
Len Mansky
Roslyn
